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THE COSTS OF COMPLEXITYt
Stephen B. Burbank*

COMPLEX LITIGATION: CASES AND MATERIALS ON ADVANCED
CIVIL PROCEDURE. By Richard L. Marcus and Edward F Sherman.
St. Paul: West Publishing Co. 1 9 85. Pp. xxxvii, 846. $32 . 9 5 .
"Complex litigation" means different things t o different people; the
term captures a multitude of sins. Not even those charged with re
sponsibility to devise procedures for complex cases in the federal
courts have essayed a definition worthy of the name. 1 Law professors
need not be lexicographers in putting together materials for course
study, although providing definition to an area of law represents per
haps the highest form of that enterprise as scholarship. When law
professors do not pursue this daunting task, and few do, 2 the enter
prise is most worthwhile if its product permits others to begin to im
pose intellectual discipline on the area, or field, that the authors have
marked as worthy of discrete attention.
It is no criticism of Complex Litigation that the authors have
neither posited a definition of the problems their materials document
nor imposed an intellectual framework within which to consider those
materials. The book breaks new ground, and the attempt would have
been premature. It is enough that the authors have conducted a thor
ough survey, identified faults in the terrain, and by mapping those
faults, provided a sound basis for development. Litigation is intensely
practical business, and the authors' choice of identifying practical
problems and recurrent patterns of response may be the best way to
approach - and is certainly necessary to discipline - theories of
complex litigation. Moreover, the authors are also concerned about
the practical needs of lawyers, 3 and in course materials designed to
t
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I.

Indeed, nobody has devised a litmus test by which one may decide whether a given

case is properly labelled complex. The Manual for Complex Litigation itself does not even
attempt to define complex litigation. Instead, in section 0.22 it simply describes types of
"potentially complex cases," focusing on either the type of claim made . . . or the procedural
characteristics of the case.
P.

2.
2 . But see, e. g., A. VON MEHREN & D. TRAUTMAN, THE LAW OF MULTISTATE PROBLEMS:

CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONFLICT OF LAWS (1965).
3. See , e. g. , p. I. See

a/so R. MARCUS & E. SHERMAN, TEACHERS MANUAL FOR COMPLEX

LITIGATION: CASES AND MATER IALS ON ADVANCED CIVIL PROCEDURE I (1985) (hereinafter
TEACHERS MANUAL]. This manual is extraordinarily well done. For one hesitant to embark on
a new course, particularly a course treating difficult material, it can serve as both a road map and
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meet those needs, the prematurity of a theory of complex litigation
would probably have been a small point at which to stick. Of course,
an unremittingly practical perspective would not be interesting to
many law professors and law students, and it would ill equip either to
change the status quo. But that is not a problem here;4 Complex Liti
gation is a rich repository of material for discussion and debate about
procedure, courts, and law. 5
A great advantage in a course on complex litigation is precisely
that the phenomenon as presently conceived is so various that it per
mits unusual freedom in the choice of materials for study. In addition,
many of the practical procedural problems of current interest emerged
in, or may be identified primarily with, litigation that for one reason or
another is deemed complex. 6 If, therefore, the authors of a casebook
on complex litigation have done their job well, at the end of the course
students should have a good sense of where the action is in American
civil procedure today.
The perception of practical problems and the proposals to solve
them have prompted reconsideration of the premises of modern Amer
ican civil procedure. 7 Reconsideration has just begun, and it is a par
ticularly difficult business. So long as the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure seemed to work well in the federal courts and attracted em
ulation in the states, there was little attention devoted to their basic
premises. 8 More generally, academics interested in theory have
tended to neglect litigation procedure.9 Indeed, as those who have suf
fered a diet of personal jurisdiction and federalism in a basic course in
civil procedure know too well, many teachers have not been interested
in the Federal Rules and in the phases of a lawsuit they address. We
have been teaching what we were taught. If the authors of a casebook
on complex litigation have done their job well, neither teacher nor stu
dent should be able to escape consideration of the premises of modern
procedure.
a security blanket. Some of the material in the manual, however, should be in the book.

See note

119 infn.
4. See p. xv (A course in advanced civil procedure presents "challenging theoretical issues at
the cutting edge of modern procedural innovation.").

5. I argue below that, notwithstanding its strengths, the book would be improved by greater
See text accompanying notes 11415 infra.

attention to modes of dispute resolution other than litigation.

6. See, e.g., text following note 30 infra (discovery).
7 . See, e.g. , Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Proce
dure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. R EV. 909 ( 19 87 ).
8. See Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. P A. L. REV. 10 15, 1 186 ( 19 82 ).
9. See G. HAZARD, JR . , RESEARCH IN CIVIL PROCEDURE 63 ( 19 63) ("With but few excep
tions, the product of procedural scholarship in the last 2 5 years is conspicuously bare of any
serious attention to what might be called the philosophy of procedure."). See also Graham, The
Persistence of Progressive Proceduralism ( Book Review), 61 TEXAS L. R EV. 929 , 9 46-48 ( 19 83).
Happily, in recent years there has been more interest in theories of procedure. See, e.g., text
accompanying notes 17 -2 1 infra.
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A course in complex litigation thus has significant potential. There
are, however, risks. One is a result of the traditional first-year curricu
lum, as described above. The authors of materials on complex litiga
tion must assume that students have basic grounding in many of the
areas that are covered, and that assumption will often prove false. As
to some matters, such as class actions (pp. 233-498), any problem is
likely to be minor, because those matters are central to the study of
complex litigation, with the result that one might as well start from
scratch. As to other topics, such as subject matter jurisdiction and
discovery, there may be a more serious problem, and teachers may
have to take remedial action. 1 0
A course in complex litigation is an imperfect vehicle for consider
ing procedural reform. Recent amendments to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure have been the subject of criticism on the ground that
they provided responses to problems arising chiefly or exclusively in
complex cases. 1 1 But if there has been distortion, complex litigation
may not be the culprit. Rather, the problem may be that today's re
formers remain transfixed by the vision of uniform, trans-substantive
procedure that animated the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 1 2
Whatever the cause, the fact that complex litigation has brought to
light serious problems may make us less critical than we ought to be
about the effects of proposed reforms in other types of cases.
Although definitional agnosticism is understandable, a risk in tak
ing the shotgun approach to complex litigation, whether in a course or
in a law reform effort, is that by focusing on particular problems
thought to be characteristic of complex litigation one may neglect rela
tionships among the problems discretely identified. Worse, in seeking
solutions for a problem in focus, one may inadvertently exacerbate
other problems. 1 3
The authors of Complex Litigation have done their job well, en
abling teachers to realize the advantages of a course on complex litiga
tion with due attention to its risks. In this essay I will explore some of
the themes that I have chosen to pursue with the authors' help, indi10. On subject matter jurisdiction, see, e.g. , pp. 63-79 ("Incidental Jurisdiction for Joinder of
Necessary Parties"), pp. 88-108 (incidental jurisdiction and sovereign immunity), and pp. 121-31
(incidental jurisdiction and intervention). On discovery, see pp. 499 -59 2. Because of the authors'
understandable desire to cast their net wide, students who have not taken a course in federal
courts may feel uneasy. See, e.g. , pp. 79 -10 8 ("Joinder Problems Involving Governmental Enti
ties"), pp. 10 8-20 ("Justiciability Issues in Joinder of Parties"), and pp. 150-67 (abstention).
11. See, e.g., Sherman, Restructuring the Trial Process in the Age of Complex Litigation
(Book Review), 63 TEXAS L. R EV. 721 , 744-45 ( 1 9 84); Friedenthal, A Divided Supreme Court
Adopts Discovery A mendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 69 CALIF. L. RE v. 80 6,
813 ( 19 81) ; text following note 30 infra.
12. See text accompanying notes 58-71 infra. As indicated there, the model of trans-substan
tive procedure may be more illusion than reality as the Federal Rules become charters for ad hoc
decisionmaking.
13. See text accompanying notes 103-1 3 infra.
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eating a few matters of interpretation or emphasis on which I disagree
with them, and literature that I have found useful in supplementation
of their work. Other teachers will have different interests and accord
ingly will perceive different strengths and weaknesses. 14 A great
strength of Complex Litigation is that it accommodates a broad range
of pedagogical agendas.
PROCEDURAL PREMISES AND PROCESS VALUES

I.

One cannot usefully evaluate a procedural system, let alone use
fully participate in debate about procedural reform, without some no
tion of the values that the system serves or that it ought to serve.
When the subject is litigation procedure, it may be possible for stu
dents to derive such values from a study of cases. But, if it is true that
little attention has been paid to procedural premises, that is a treacher
ous strategy. 1 5 The authors of Complex Litigation evidently recog
nized the problem; indeed, they apologize for the theoretical cast of
their opening chapter. 1 6 If an apology is in order, it is that the intro
ductory materials are incomplete and potentially misleading.
The introductory materials address the question of process values
only indirectly. For one who regards that question as important in a
course on complex litigation, it may be useful to provide additional
background reading. For that purpose, I assign selections from a valu
able collection of readings put together some years ago by the late
Robert Cover and Owen Fiss. 1 7 Those readings force students to con
front values that compete, or that should compete, with efficient ad
ministration in the lawmaking calculus. 1 8 The advantage of the
readings lies precisely in their abstraction, their tendency to encourage
critical analysis of both reform proposals and the rules we now have.
1 4 . See. e.g Abrams, The New Civil Procedure (Book Review), 32 WAYNE L. REV. 1269
(1986).
.•

15. See, e.g., G. HAZARD, JR., supra note 9, at 63-64.
It is only when the nature or adequacy of a particular procedural structure is itself brought
into issue that one finds a court addressing questions normally taken for granted: What do
we wish procedure to do in this kind of case? What sort of procedural system will accom
plish that set of aims? What will it cost in money, and in values not readily monetized?
How would such a system feed back upon norms and institutions already functioning in this
and related areas?
R. COVER & 0. FISS, THE STRUCTURE OF PROCEDURE 2 (1979).
The suggested strategy is also treacherous because litigated cases may give a skewed view of
process values in a system dominated by pre-trial dispositions. Moreover, exclusive attention to
values informing, or that should inform, litigation procedure may hinder the effort to decide
what disputes belong in court in the first place. See text accompanying notes 114-37 infra.
16. See TEACHERS MANUAL, supra note 3, at I.
1 7 . See R . COVER & 0. FISS, supra note 1 5 , at ch. I ("Valuing Process"). See also, e.g.,
Bush, Dispute Resolution Alternatives and the Goals of Civil Justice: Jurisdictional Principles for
Process Choice, 1984 Wis. L. REv. 893; Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984);
Summers, Evaluating and Improving Legal Processes - A Plea for "Process Values, " 60 CoR
NELL L. REV. I (1974).
18. See R. CovER & 0. FISS, supra note 15, at 7; Bush, supra note 17, at 929-30.
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To the extent that the readings consider process values in the context
of the constitutional norm of due process, 19 they have an additional
attraction. Students may begin to see a link between changing concep
tions of the constitutional norm and the importance we attach to vari
ous process values. 20 More generally, consideration of process values
may shed light on the movement toward alternative dispute resolution
by calling into question premises reflected in the very name of that
movement. 2 1
A major theme of the authors' first chapter is that complex litiga
tion is part of a "metamorphosis in litigation, " as a result of which the
courts are in crisis (pp. 1 - 1 3). The authors attribute these changes in
litigation to procedural reforms, technological advances, and the
proliferation of substantive law.22 But they also speak of an "ava
lanche of cases" (p. 1), of "the litigation boom" (p. 2), and of "a grow
ing public inclination to litigate virtually any issue" (p. 2). Moreover,
they include an excerpt from an article23 in which the author refers to
an "explosion" in civil litigation, arguing that "judicial services are a
scarce resource" that is being overtaxed (p. 5).
Both the authors' introductory material and this excerpt exhibit
the tendency, so well documented by Professor Galanter, to blur dis
tinctions between types of cases (including complex litigation and
other litigation), between litigation in the federal and state courts, be
tween cases filed and cases tried, and between use and over-use of the
courts.24 The result is a picture of the dispute landscape sadly lacking
19. See Michelman, The Supreme Court and Litigation Access Fees: The Right to Protect
One's Rights - Part I, 197 3 DUKE L.J. 1153, excerpted in R. CoVER & 0. F1ss, supra note 15, at
3-6; Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in Ma
thews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REv. 28 ( 1 97 6),
excerpted in R. COVER & 0. FISS, supra note 15, at 18-2 6.
20. See Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 632 ( 19 62 ); Burbank, Sanctions in the Proposed
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Some Questions About Power, 11 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 997, 1008-10 (19 83).
2 1. See text accompanying notes 12 5-27 infra.
22. See p. 1. Professor Bator vividly describes the last of these phenomena in speaking of
"the promiscuity with which Congress and the courts have vied, in the past 2 5 years, to make our
federal courts into dynamic litigation-attracting engines for the creation and expansion of rights
and the redistribution of powers and entitlements in our society." Bator, The Judicial Universe
of Judge Richard Posn er (Book Review), 52 U. CHI. L. REv. 1146, 1148 (1985).
2 3. Kirkham, Problems of Complex Civil Litigation, 83 F.R.D. 497 ( 1979), excerpted at pp. 35.
2 4. See, e.g., Galanter, The Day After the Litigation Explosion, 46 Mo. L. REV. 3 ( 19 86)
[hereinafter Galanter, Litigation Explosion]; Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What
We Know and Don't Know (and Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious
Society, 31 UCLA L. REv. 4 ( 19 83) [hereinafter Galanter, Landscape] . This is not to suggest
that there are no problems. See, e.g., R. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM
59 -129 (19 85); Saks, If There Be a Crisis, How Shall We Know It?, 46 Mo. L. REV. 63 ( 19 86);
Alschuler, Mediation with a Mugger: The Shortage of Adjudicative Services and the Need for a
Two-Tier Trial System in Civil Cases, 99 H ARV. L. REV. 180 8, 1817-20 (19 86); Rhode, The
Rhetoric of Professional Reform, 45 Mo. L. REv. 27 4, 27 6-88 (19 86); Levin & Colliers, Contain
ing the Cost of Litigation, 37 RUTGERS L. REV. 219 ( 19 85).
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in perspective, and the problem is not simply empirical. The rhetori
cal tendency of the "litigation explosion" story is to deflect attention
from values other than efficient administration in the effort to end the
"crisis," dam the "flood," or stem the "avalanche." The authors do
ask whether the "tendency toward efficiency, which makes lawsuits
resemble administrative proceedings, [is] a desirable development."25
But their own rhetoric may suggest that the answer to that question is
irrelevant.
The two readings provided as counterweights to the "litigation ex
plosion" and "crisis in the adversary system" (pp. 1 3-22) stories seem,
at least as edited and in light of intervening developments, short
sighted. To be sure, one of them subjects the language of procedural
reform to a microscope and decries the motivational pathology thus
discovered.26 But in that respect the piece is an invitation to be cyni
cal rather than critical. 27 More important, both selections celebrate
the existing system. The result may be a skewed view of reform alter
natives, as well as a weak defense against the rhetoric of crisis.
Professor Chayes' influential article, The Role of the Judge in Pub
lic Law Litigation,Z8 posited a shift in the nature of litigation that the
author attributed to a basic reorientation in the way we think about
litigation (p. 1 1 ) It encouraged us to regard the phenomenon as the
norm. 29 Indeed, Professor Chayes suggested that the changes he per
ceived were the result of the purposive design of procedural reformers,
rather than the unintended effects of their efforts. 30
Professor Friedenthal's defense of the existing discovery system
against comprehensive reform recognized the danger of using complex
litigation as a norm for trans-substantive amendments (p. 20). He saw
in the reform effort an attempt to redress the unintended substantive
.

25. P. 9. See also p. 13 ("Is the administrative mode a necessary response by the courts to
the demands of litigation?")
26. See Friedenthal, supra note 11 , at 81 3-14, excerpted at p. 18.
27 . See Rosenberg, Foreword, 69 CALIF. L. REv. 647, 64 8 (19 81).
28. Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV . 1 281 (197 6),
excerpted at pp. 9-13.
29. See p. 10 . In a subsequent section of his article not excerpted in Complex Litigation,
Professor Chayes hedged on any quantitative claim. See Chayes, supra note 28, at 1303-04. Cf
Elliott, Managerial Judging and the Evolution of Procedure, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 30 6, 325 n. 77
(19 86) ("Rather than argue about which oversimplification is more inaccurate, we should recog
nize that modern litigation involves a broad spectrum of different kinds of disputes, and therefore
that we need a variety of different processes.").
30. The history is much more complicated than Professor Chayes suggests. See Subrin,
supra note 7. Professor Subrin's work reveals, however, that for Dean Clark (the Reporter of the
original Federal Rules of Civil Procedure) at least, a procedural system based on equity had as
one of its attractions the capacity to accommodate public law litigation. See id. at 9 61 - 7 3.
In this respect, Professor Chayes is closer to the mark than those who have attributed to the
original rulemakers the paradigm of "the relatively simple diversity case." Compare Resnik,
Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CH I . L. REV. 494, 508 ( 19 86), with
Subrin, supra note 7, at 97 2-7 3 & n . 37 5.
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impact of the discovery rules (pp. 20-21 ) Acknowledging the exist
ence of discovery abuse, he remitted litigants to the discretion of the
trial judge or to changes in the substantive law (p. 20).
Both Professor Chayes and Professor Friedenthal were anxious to
defend the social gains made possible by the procedural system initi
ated by the Federal Rules, which, it should constantly be borne in
mind, have been considerable. They did not, however, seriously en
gage its costs or question its premises. In the case of Professor
Chayes, however, it is important to note that the effort was "prelimi
nary" and "impressionistic."3 1 Moreover, he stressed the need for ad
ditional research and identified a number of potential costs of his
model. Today, his questions can no longer be ignored:
.

Can the disinterestedness of the judge be sustained, for example, when he
is more visibly a part of the political process? Will the consciously nego
tiated character of the relief ultimately erode the sense that what is being
applied is law?32
*

*

*

A critical question for research is whether this potential is or can be
exploited to· produce a party structure that is adequately representative
in light of the consequences of public law litigation without introducing
so much complexity that the procedure falls of its own weight. 33

Professor Chayes correctly perceived that equity has triumphed in
the remedial phase of litigation. 34 What he did not fully grasp is that
equity triumphed throughout the Federal Rules.35 That perception,
recently and ably documented by Professor Subrin,36 should provide
additional focus to an inquiry into process values. Thus, to what ex
tent did equity attach relatively greater importance to the values of
participation and deterrence than to the values of dignity and effectua
tion?37 From a law reform perspective, focusing on equity suggests
31. Chayes, supra note 28, at 1281.
32. Id. at 1309.
33. Id. at 1312.
34. See pp. 1 2-13; Chayes, supra note 2 8 , at 1 292-96.
35. For recognition by Professor Chayes of borrowing from equity, see Chayes, supra note
28, at 1303. See also note 30 supra.
36. See Subrin, supra note 7. See also G. HAZARD, JR., supra note 9, at 118 ("At the turn of
this century, Maitland said that the common law forms of action rule us from their graves. I
think it can be said that the formulae of equity likewise rule us today. They will do so until they
are met and mastered.") (footnote omitted); Burbank, supra note 8, at 1168 n.657.
37. Dignity values reflect concern for the humiliation or loss of self-respect which a person
might suffer if denied an opportunity to litigate. Participation values reflect an appreciation
of litigation as one of the modes in which persons exert influence, or have their wills
"counted," in societal decisions they care about. Deterrence values recognize the instrumen
tality of litigation as a mechanism for influencing or constraining individual behavior in
ways thought socially desirable. Effectuation values see litigation as an important means
through which persons are enabled to get, or are given assurance of having, whatever we are
pleased to regard as rightfully theirs.
R. CovER & 0. Ftss, supra note 15, at 4 (excerpting Michelman, supra note 19 (footnote omit
ted)). Cf Chayes, Foreword: Public Law Litigation and the Burger Court, 96 HARV. L. REV. 4,
36 (1982) ("[T]o permit strict enforcement through the small claims class action is to elevate
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that those who, with Professor Friedenthal, seek to preserve the gains
made possible by the existing system without reexamining its premises
are likely to lose. Those responsible for procedural reform know that
discretion is an instrument of power. 38 They know that what the
Chancellor gives, the Chancellor can take away. 39 It may be that the
rulemakers should not concentrate on "turning back the clock"40 their
predecessors built. But so long as discretion dominates procedure,
procedure will dominate substantive law.
Having said this, it is important to note that Complex Litigation
permits teachers and students who are so inclined to pursue process
values and hence some of the costs of complexity. Certainly, the
materials on compulsory party joinder (pp. 5 1 -79), intervention (pp.
1 20-47), and class actions (pp. 233-498) are good vehicles for explor
ing such questions, in particular the extent to which efficient adminis
tration has assumed a dominant position in the calculus. 4 1 My
deterrent and punitive objectives over compensatory ones.") (footnote omitted). This article is
excerpted at pp. 116-18. For caution about exclusive attention to adjudicatory procedure, see
note 15 supra; notes 114 -37 infra and accompanying text.
38. "Discretion is, of course, an instrument of power. Those who would embrace it are well
advised to consider where ultimate power lies and to be alert to the risks of its exercise. " Bur
bank, Procedural Rulemaking Under the Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and
Disability Act of 1980, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 2 83, 309 (19 82 ). "For Progressive proceduralists, the
power of the state is embodied in the judge, and it is his authority that must be expanded if
justice is to be done." Graham, supra note 9, at 943.
39 . Professor Chayes surely knows this too. Cf Chayes, supra note 37 , at 46 ("Control of
remedial discretion is therefore an insistent problem in a public law system."). His defense
against doctrinal manipulation may, however, be wishful thinking:
[T)he public law trend does not simply reflect the political or ideological coloration of a
generation of federal judges. The development is rooted in much more pervasive changes in
the contemporary "legal consciousness" - our ways of thinking about law and the legal
system - that are in tum related to changes in the larger social, political, and cultural
environment. If this claim is valid, it implies that the development in question can be af
fected only marginally even by sustained resistance in the Supreme Court.
!d. at 8 (footnote omitted). See Bush, supra note 17 , at 943 ("The advocate of the disfavored
'higher' or 'superior' goal would do better in practice to argue his case on the common ground of
concrete social impact, since otherwise he may lose that ground by default, while maintaining the
high ground of principle or ideology to little avail.").
40. See Chayes, supra note 2 8, at 1313. In a similar vein, Professor Friedenthal asserts that
"[f]rom a theoretical point of view, the current practice of allowing general pleadings and exten
sive discovery cannot seriously be challenged." Friedenthal, supra note 11, at 816-17 . But cf
Rosenberg, supra note 27, at 651 (questioning whether "the 'hope of discovering a claim' [is] a
proper purpose of discovery, as Professor Friedenthal forthrightly argues").
4 1 . United States v. Reserve Mining Co., 56 F.R.D. 408 (D. Minn. 197 2 ), excerpted at pp.
135-4 5, provides a marvelous vehicle for considering a number of process values in the context of
intervention. Moreover, although the court accorded great weight to the value of participation,
it is evident from the constraints placed on the intervenors, see p. 14 5, that what one hand gives,
the other may take away. See also Trangsrud, Joinder Altern atives in Mass Tort Litigation, 70
CORNELL L. REv. 779 ,779 -80 (19 85) (exploring "the inescapable tension between the interest of
individual litigants in preserving individual control of claims and procedural fairness . . . and the
interest of the judicial system in the efficient joinder of related claims.").
As a constituent element of the effect of current approaches to complex litigation on individ
ual control, a calculation of the costs of complexity should consider their effect on the lawyer
client relationship. See, e.g., pp. 47 6-9 8 (judicial control of class action settlements); pp. 643-53
(lead and liaison counsel).
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comments reflect one teacher's conviction that the perspective is suffi
ciently important to warrant more extensive and self-conscious atten
tion at the outset of a course in complex litigation. Moreover, they
reflect my concern that because we are educating the next generation
of law reformers, it is important at least to set a framework for the
consideration of reform, even in a course with an avowedly practical
orientation.
II.

PROCEDURE AS AN INSTRUMENT OF POWER

The excerpt from Professor Friedenthal's article discussed above42
introduces the reader of Complex Litigation to an important theme
recurring throughout the book: the influence of "procedural" rules on
the substantive law. The authors invite students to consider the prob
lem of tailoring procedure to the substantive law and the extent to
which procedure makes possible, or drives, changes in the substantive
law. Here again, I have found it useful to supplement the material in
the casebook with readings from The Structure of Procedure. 43 But
here, the materials ably speak for themselves.
The issues suggested by the theme of procedure as an instrument of
power are not unique to complex litigation, but Complex Litigation
permits, indeed encourages, consideration of them. In the materials
on party joinder and consolidation, students are repeatedly exposed to
the substantive implications of joinder44 and led to consider the extent
to which efficiency concerns cause courts to bend the requirements of
procedural rules, 45 to pursue dubious packaging strategies that are
supposedly provisional but that in substantive terms may be irremedi
able,46 and, alternatively, to pursue dubious substantive strategies that
enable packaging.47 A recurring question raised by the authors'
materials is which - joinder or change in the substantive law - is the
chicken and which the egg. That question is particularly insistent in
mass tort cases, which receive due attention from the authors.48 It is
42. See text following note 30, and text accompanying notes 38-40 supra .
4 3. See R. COVER & 0. FISS, supra note 15, ch. 2 ("The Independence of Procedure?").
44. See, e.g., pp. 28-32, 38-51, 19 1-206.
4 5. See, e.g., pp. 51-58 (compulsory party joinder). It is particularly instructive to compare
Whyham v. Piper Aircraft Corp., pp. 5!-57 , with Field v. Volkswagenwerk AG, pp. 7 1-77 .
4 6. See pp. 194 -203 (pre-trial consolidation including consolidated complaint).
47. See pp. 38-51 (permissive party joinder without resolving choice-of-law question).
4 8. See, e.g., pp. 319 -33 & 340-53 (class actions). One's answer to the question whether a
DES plaintiff proceeding under a theory of market-share liability should be required to demon
strate "due diligence" in seeking to identify the manufacturer of the drug taken by her mother
may depend on one's choice of a procedural or substantive perspective. If one regards cases such
as Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 2 6 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, cert. denied,
449 U.S. 9 12 ( 1 9 80 ), discussed at pp. 4 8-50, as providing procedural solutions to problems of
proof - in effect establishing a presumption - a requirement of due diligence approaches a
logical imperative. That is, one of the basic facts is that plaintiff, through no fault of her own,
has been unable to identify the manufacturer. If, on the other hand, one regards market share

''f'f." '
'
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perhaps most sharply put in the materials on class actions, where we
see a court use a presumption to reallocate burdens, thereby overcom
ing a major obstacle to class certification, and respond to a charge of
overreaching by announcing that the presumption is available in indi
vidual actions.49 It could also have been pursued with profit in the
context of settlement, because that context vividly illustrates both the
instrumental use of provisional substantive strategies50 and the propo
sition that alternative dispute resolution represents the ultimate tri
umph of equity (and defeat of law). 51
The premise implicit in the above, that complex litigation may ex
act a cost when the procedural system designed to accommodate it
effects changes in the substantive law, requires refinement. Professor
Graham has speculated that academics embrace what he calls "the
Progressive drive for procedural uniformity"52 because of their

{
I

unconscious understanding that lack of uniformity is a threat to the
claim that procedure is a value-free science. If there is more than one
scientifically valid way to litigate, then the choice of one or the other
procedural system must be based on values; in other words, the selection
of one mode of proceeding over another is a political choice. 53

It is true that procedural rules are never neutral in their effects, if
not their purposes. 54 It is also likely that there has been more system
atic misrepresentation about the value-free nature of procedural rules
than about any other category in the traditional lexicon. But what
does it mean to say that procedural choices are "political"? To some it
may mean either that procedural choices are driven by an individual's
own substantive values or that they should be. One holding that view
liability as a theory of substantive law disembodied from the procedural setting that brought it
forth, due diligence is irrelevant. See generally Note, The Application of a Due Diligence Require
ment to Market Share Theory in DES Litigation, 19 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 771 (1986).
49. See Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 908 (9th Cir. 1975), excerpted at pp. 265-75. The
court's treatment of damages in the context of adequacy of representation is amenable to a simi
lar analysis. See pp. 272-75. See generally Scott, The Impact of Class Actions on Rule JOb-5, 3 8
U. CHI. L . REv. 337 ( 1 971), excerpted i n R. CovER & 0 . FISS, supra note 1 5 , a t 86-94. O f
course, as Professor Scott points out, the quest for efficient administration is not the only value
- indeed, it may not plausibly be deemed important- in leading courts to creative solutions in
the class action context. See id. at 93-94. See also pp. 7-9, 319-33 (rule 23(b)(l) class actions).
50. See Schuck, The Role of Judges in Settling Complex Cases: The Agent Orange Example,
53 U. CHI. L. REv. 337, 351-5 3 (1986); Miller & Crump, Jurisdiction and Choice of Law in
Multistate Class Actions After Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 96 YALE L.J. 1, 65-66 (1986).
See also pp. 86-87.
51. See text accompanying notes 114-36 infra.
52. Graham, supra note 9, at 945.
53. Id.
54. Consider a rule requiring that an answer to a complaint be filed within twenty days of
service. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(a). The purpose of the rule is evidently to ensure that once a
lawsuit is commenced it proceeds. The rule is inherently arbitrary in the sense that within a
certain range it is hard to argue persuasively for one period over another. But the rule is not
neutral. Some people will have greater difficulty than others complying with the rule, whether
because of lack of legal sophistication or lack of access to a lawyer. Thus, even the most neutral
appearing rule can have differential impact. See e.g. , Elliott, supra note 29, at 325-26.
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may be suspicious of the purposes of every judge or law reformer who
has a choice in the application or formulation of doctrine. There is,
however, a difference between purposes and effects. Neither judges
nor procedural reformers have a general charter to reform society, and
broad-scale social reform would be necessary to eradicate the non-neu
tral effects of many, and perhaps most, procedural rules.
If procedural rules are not neutral and judges and reformers
should not use procedural rules to advance their own substantive val
ues, we encounter a paradox: neutral transmission of the substantive
law, if possible, would itself be a political act because it would rein
force the status quo. The paradox disappears to the extent that one
can distinguish individuals' values from the values that inform the
rules of substantive law. 55 The reminder that there is no bright line
between procedure and substantive law has been a refuge of pro
cedural reformers for fifty years. But the existence of "under
determinacy" is no reason to wipe the slate clean. 56
According to this view, the perception that procedural rules are
not neutral makes it important to try to identify the impact of proce
dural rules and to be candid in describing that impact. The perception
also makes it important to be candid in describing the purposes of
procedural rules. Because avowedly procedural rules may have either
substantive purposes or substantive effects, consideration should be
given to the political legitimacy of the process by which they are for
mulated or applied and of the actors who are formulating or applying
them. Rather than giving up on the procedure/substance dichotomy,
we should craft it with attention to its ultimately political
ramifications. 57
There is today increasing movement towards, and interest in, de
partures from the norm of trans-substantive procedure. 58 In consider55. Even when the values that inform the rules of substantive law are indeterminate,
it is not true (although it is today often said) that a judge's decision not to intervene to
change something is "as much" a decision as a decision to change it. The latter entails, the
former does not, an (additional) coercive i ntervention, which enforces the judge's opinion on
how things should be. It should not be indulged in unless the relevant authoritative texts
strongly support it.
Bator, supra note 22, at 1165.
56. See, e.g. , Burbank, supra note 8, at 1133-35 n. 530, 1187-89. Cf Galanter, Landscape,
supra note 24, at 71:
If interpretation is inevitable, how can one be superior to another? This shouldn't be much
of a puzzle for lawyers. We are in the business of assessing competing interpretations. We
know that just because something can be said for one reading of a matter, it is not automati
cally a toss-up between that and some other view.
See also Bator, supra note 22, at 1163 ("The fact that interpretation does not admit to some
mechanical procedure of validation is not a fatal objection to the concept of interpretation.").
For the concept of "underdeterminacy," see Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing
Critical Dogma, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 462, 473 (1987).
57. See, e.g. , Burbank, Proposals to Amend Rule 68- Time to Abandon Ship, 19 U. MICH.
J.L. REF. 425 (1986).
58. See, e. g., T. WILLGING, ASBESTOS CASE MANAGEMENT: PRETRIAL AND TRIAL PROCE-
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ing the alternatives, it is important to distinguish between procedure
that is tailored to the case, in the sense that it is ad hoc, and procedure
crafted in advance for a type of case. Many of the Federal Rules au
thorize essentially ad hoc decisions and therefore are trans-substantive
in only the most trivial sense. The trend may be toward rules confer
ring greater discretion on the trial judge. 59 I have already suggested
that discretion will not preserve the substantive law.60 The issue of
trans-substantiveness is linked with the issue of formalism. 6 1
The general charters that today masquerade as rules62 present no
necessary logical obstacle to the historic procedural goal of delivering
substantive rights.63 Both my own analyses under the Enabling Act
and Professor Cover's more speculative work suggest that nonformal
rules, whether embodied in Federal Rules or in case law, need not
DURES 15-24, 31-35 ( 1 985); Subrin, supra note 7, at 977, 985, 99 1 , 995-96; Marcus, The Revival
of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 4 3 3 (1986);
Rosenberg, The Federal Civil Rules After Half a Century, 36 ME. L. REV. 243 (1984).

59. See, e.g., FED. R. C1v. P . 16. The recent amendments dealing with sanctions may only
be an apparent exception to this trend. See FED. R. CIV. P . I I , 16(f), 26(g); Burbank, supra note
20, at 1008-10.
60. See text accompanying notes 34-40 supra.
61. Cf Michelman, Formal and Associational Aims in Procedural Due Process, in DuE PRo
XVII I 126, 129 (1977) ("a procedure is formal insofar as its . . . purpose is to
vindicate legal entitlement, to secure to an individual that which is rightfully his").

CESS: NoMos

62. Surely it is the function of law, or at least one of its functions, to put certain questions
beyond dispute or present re-examination. By this I do not mean scientific dispute or re
examination, nor do I mean that the rules themselves ought not to be re-examined, as when
a statute is amended or a case overruled. What I do mean is that a rule, to have cognitive
and normative significance as such, must have an important degree of determinative content
to the group to whom it is addressed. To the extent that the rule says only that the adjudica
tor is to "use his sound discretion," the rule as a rule says nothing about the disposition of
the controversy, except to designate who is to make the disposition. To adopt a rule that has
determinative content is of course to forego in some measure the quest for "justice" in par
ticular cases that has been such a strong motivation in the recent past. Yet it seems clear
that the quest for "justice," carried to its extremes, is every bit as futile and therefore every
bit as destructive of a legal order as the quest for "certainty" proved to be when carried to
its extremes . . . .
The construction of satisfactory legal generalizations ought to be the special province of
legal scholarship, for legal scholars are most free of the pressures of time and interest that
impair careful and circumspect analysis. Yet there seems relatively little productive effort
along these lines. Perhaps this is because the impact of legal realism has induced a shyness
or even embarrassment about attempting generalization.
G. HAZARD, JR., supra note 9, at 9-11.
63. Our infatuation with equity has helped us to forget the historic purpose of adjudica
tion. Courts exist not only to resolve disputes, but to resolve them in a way that takes law
seriously by trying to apply legal principles to the events that brought the parties to court.
The total victory of equity process has caused us to forget the essence of civil adjudication:
enabling citizens to have their legitimate expectancies and rights fulfilled. We are good at
using equity process and thought to create new general rights. We have, however, largely
failed at defining rights and providing methods for their efficient vindication. The effort to
defeat formalism so that society could move forward toward new ideas of social justice
neglected the benefits of formalism once new rights had been created.
Subrin, supra note 7, at 1001. Cf Bator, supra note 22, at 1 148 (suggesting a "connection be
tween rising caseloads and the instability, unpredictability, and vagueness of our constitutional,
statutory, and judge-made law").
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raise allocation of power issues. 64 The concern, however, is that sub
stantive policy choices will be buried, a concern that implicates both
democratic values and the values of Justice Harlan's vision of law.65
Consideration of democratic values suggests that whatever one
thinks of the goal of trans-substantive Federal Rules it may be folly to
have as a goal their adoption by the states. 66 State courts historically
have had much greater freedom to fashion common law than have the
federal courts. 67 If state courts' substantive policy choices are buried
in the application of "adjective law," the issue may only be one of
accountability in the weak sense - of a court publicly taking responsi
bility for decisions that it is empowered to make (and thus risking
legislative override).
Federal courts, on the other hand, are thought to be significantly
more constrained in their lawmaking powers, particularly in state-law
cases. 68 Their buried substantive policy choices therefore are more
likely to raise the issue of accountability in both the weak sense just
described and in the strong sense of allocation of power. 69
These observations suggest another way to view the occasion of the
effectiveness of the Federal Rules, of the Erie decision,70 and of the
"new federal common law,"7 1 in the same year. As rules of equity
procedure, the Federal Rules permitted the federal courts to retain
6 4. See Burbank, supra note 8, at 1193; Burbank, supra note 20, at I008; Burbank, supra note
57, at 430 , 433-34; Cover, For James Wm. Moore: Some Reflections on a Reading of the Rules,
84 YALE L.J. 7 18, 7 22-40 ( 197 5), excerpted in R. COVER & 0. FISS, supra note 15, at 7 5-85.
6 5. Perhaps no characteristic of an organized and cohesive society is more fundamental
than its erection and enforcement of a system of rules defining the various rights and duties
of its members, enabling them to govern their affairs and definitively settle their differences
in an orderly predictable manner. Without such a "legal system," social organization and
cohesion are virtually impossible . . . . Put more succinctly, it is this injection of the rule of
law that allows society to reap the benefits of rejecting what political theorists call the "state
of nature."
Boddie v. Connecticut, 40 1 U.S. 37 1, 37 4 ( 1 970), quoted in Subrin, supra note 7, at 988. See also
Summers, supra note 17 , at 21- 22 (process legitimacy), 25-26 (procedural legality). But see
Chayes, supra note 28, at 1313-16 (legitimacy).
66. For a recent attempt to assess the extent of state borrowing, see Oakley & Coon, The
Federal Rules in State Courts: A Survey of State Court Systems of Civil Procedure, 61 WASH. L.
REV. 1367 ( 1986 ).
67. See, e.g., Jay, Origins of Federal Common Law: Part One, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 1003
( 1985). Cf Bator, supra note 22, at 116 4-6 5 (distinguishing between federal and state courts in
discussing reasons for judicial self-restraint and deference).
6 8. See, e.g. , Jay, supra note 67; Burbank, In terjurisdictional Preclusion, Full Faith and
Credit an d Federal Common Law: A General A pproach, 70 CORNELL L. REv. 7 33, 7 53-6 2, 7 7 897 ( 1986).
6 9. See, e.g., Rosales v. Honda Motor Co., 7 26 F.2d 259 (5th Cir. 1984) (FED. R. C1v. P. 42);
Burbank, supra note 8, at 1193 & n .763. Cf Federal Kemper Ins. Co. v. Rauscher, 807 F.2d 345
(3d Cir. 1986 ) (federal standing decision submerging question whether injured party can seek
reformation of insurance contract under state law).
70. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 30 4 U.S. 6 4 ( 1938).
7 1. See Friendly, In Praise of Erie - A n d of the New Federal Common Law, 3 9 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 383 ( 196 4); Hinderlider v. LaP!ata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 30 4 U.S. 92 ( 1938).
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some of their historic power, even in state-law cases, without appear
ing to do so.
Ill.

CREATING COMPLEXITY

Complex Litigation provides many opportunities to explore the
costs and benefits of using the Federal Rules to create litigation that is
complex by reason of its structure (parties or issues). The chapter on
judicial control of litigation (pp. 593-737) sharpens that perspective.
Moreover, this material and the authors' chapter on duplicative or re
lated litigation (pp. 148-232) prompt the questions whether we are on
the road to even more complex litigation and why.
The chapter on judicial control of litigation revisits issues that
from the perspective of law reform are among the most important in
the field of procedure. How those issues are resolved will influence the
procedural systems of the twenty-first century.
The recent reforms in the system we inherited from 1 9 3 8 have been
in the nature of adjustments, often inspired by informal measures pre
viously adopted. Those responsible for both have articulated as their
dominant concerns abuses of the existing system and the need to tailor
existing mechanisms to the demands of modern litigation. Judges and
law reformers have returned again and again to the state of the courts'
dockets (pp. 593-606). But it is surely simplistic to see in what they
say only a desire for more efficient administration. As Professor Ga
lanter has observed, reform rhetoric about case overload is now at
tended by rhetoric about over-use,72 a different type of abuse;
moreover, judicial control implicates judicial power.
There is nothing wrong with a strategy of reform that looks to
make adjustments in the existing system, so long as that system is basi
cally sound. To determine whether the system is sound, it would help
to have some historical perspective on the system, its underlying goals
and assumptions. As I have previously suggested, procedural reform
ers characteristically neglect such matters. 73
A historical perspective on judicial control of litigation would in
volve inquiry as to the place of judicial management in the system
initiated by the Federal Rules. Both the published work and unpub
lished papers of Edson Sunderland, the chief architect of the rules on
discovery, pre-trial conference, and summary judgment, suggest that
he thought those mechanisms would measurably assist in separating
the wheat from the chaff.74 Thus, the recent amendments to rule 1 6
72. See Galanter, Landscape, supra note 24, at 5- 1 1 , 6 1 - 7 1 . Cf text accompanying notes 1 1 61 7 infra ("warm" and "cool" themes in discussion of settlement).
7 3. See text accompanying notes 8-9 & 1 5 supra.
74. See, e.g, Letter from Edson R. Sunderland to Harry D. Nims (Nov. I, 1 93 5 ) (Edson R.
Sunderland Papers, Michigan Historical Collections, Bentley Historical Library, University of
Michigan, box 4, folder N) [hereinafter Sunderland Papers]; Letter from Edson R. Sunderland to
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(pp. 602-04) and the current effort to revise rule 5 675 can be rational
ized and justified as an attempt to make the Federal Rules work as
they were intended to work. In other respects, recent amendments
can be seen as corrections of the original draftsmen's mistakes. Thus,
amended rule 1 1 (p. 606) and the provision in amended rule 1 6 au
thorizing the "participants" at a pre-trial conference to "consider and
take action with respect to . . . the formulation and simplification of
issues, including the elimination of frivolous claims or defenses"76 rep
resent a return to techniques of control that, as Professor Subrin has
demonstrated, were considered and rejected during the drafting of the
original Federal Rules. 77
Harry D. Nims (Sept. I I, 1937 ) (id. ); E. Sunderland, The Principles Underlying the New Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 13- 23 (undated) (Sunderland Papers, box 18). See also Subrin, supra
note 7, at 979; Sunderland, The Theory and Practice of Pre-Trial Procedure, 36 MICH. L. REV.
21 5 ( 1 937 ) [hereinafter Sunderland, Theory and Practice]; Sunderland, Discovery Before Trial
Under the New Federal Rules, 1 5 TENN. L. REV. 7 37 ( 1939) [hereinafter Sunderland, Discovery
Before Trial]; Sunderland, Trends in Procedural Law, 1 LA. L. REV. 477, 4 86-88, 4 94 -98 ( 1939).
For Sunderland's role in drafting these rules, see Clark, Edson Sunderland and the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 58 MICH. L. REv. 6, 10 ( 1959). Clark recalled that "Mr. Mitchell
[chairman of the Advisory Committee) himself had a major hand in the final rewording of rule
16," but he observed that "its original conception, as well as the several rules for discovery and
summary judgment, was and now remains a tribute to Edson's genius." Id.
According to Professor Elliott, "as the framers envisioned their new system, the issue-nar
rowing function was to be performed not by pleading, but by discovery and summary judgment."
Elliott, supra note 29, at 319. Although convenient to Elliott's evolutionary thesis, see also Al
schuler, supra note 24, at 1832, this account neglects the importance that Sunderland in particu
lar attached to the pretrial conference, which he sometimes discussed as a form of judicial
discovery:
It is clear that the court, as well as the parties, has a direct interest in eliminating ficti
tious and non-substantial issues before trial, so as to avoid the waste of time that inevitably
occurs under our traditional procedure. In other words, the court itself ought to be inter
ested in a type of discovery designed to determine what are the real issues to be tried. This
discovery would supplement the discovery instituted by the parties, and might very well
come after the parties have made such use as they care to of the discovery methods available
to themselves. At that stage the parties would be in a position to give the court a very
definite idea of their real attitude toward the various apparent issues appearing on the rec
ord, if the court should undertake, by means of a conference with attorneys representing
both parties, to probe into the question of the possibilities of proof.
This type of discovery, instituted by the court at its own instance and in its own interest,
is provided by rule 16. Under this rule the court in its discretion in any case, or by general
rule, may hold a pre-trial hearing to consider: (1) Simplifying the issues; (2) Amendments;
(3) Admission of facts or documents; (4) Limiting the number of expert witnesses; ( 5) Refer
ences; (6) Other matters likely to aid in the disposition of the matter.
Sunderland, Discovery Before Trial, supra, at 7 53.
It is true, however, that the Advisory Committee had rejected a proposal that would have
bestowed greater power on trial judges to formulate the issues to be tried. See Subrin, supra note
7, at 978-79; text accompanying notes 7 6-77 infra. Moreover, not even Professor Sunderland
seems to have contemplated judicial conduct, as opposed to judicial control, of fact gathering.
For a proposal to that end, see Langbein, The German A dvantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI.
L. REV. 823, 825 ( 1 985).
7 5. See note 78 infra. Dean Carrington, the reporter for the Civil Rules Advisory Commit
tee, has been working on revisions of rule 56. See Letter from Paul D. Carrington to Stephen B.
Burbank (Aug. 4, 1986) (copy on file with the Michigan Law Review).
7 6. FED. R. Clv. P. 16.
7 7 . See Subrin, supra note 7, at 977 -7 9 (verification of complaint and order formulating is
sues to be tried). See note 74 supra.

r
\

I

1 47 8

Michigan L a w Review

(Vol. 85:1463

On another view, however, both the recent amendments to the
Federal Rules and the rulemakers' agenda for future reforms relating
to judicial control of litigation78 should cause us to question the prem
ises of the system we inherited before adjusting it. Loosening the stan
dards for summary judgment will further empower federal judges at
the expense of juries. 7 9 The same is true of recent amendments to rule
1 6 on pre-trial procedure. 8 0 Everyone admits that there has been
abuse of the litigation process in federal courts, but in a formless sys
tem, abuse may be in the eye of the beholder. Perhaps more impor
tant, the recent emphasis on punishing lawyers and their clients8 1
tends to deflect attention - a tried and true technique of procedural
reform82 - in this case, from the abuses of federal judges and from
their responsibility to resist easy solutions, including prominently
those that empower them. 83
If it turns out, as I expect it will turn out, that adjustments to the
received system are not enough to make it work in the way in which
the demands of the next century will require, a historical perspective
will also be useful in designing an alternative system. For this pur
pose, the central perception may be that the Federal Rules, merging
7 8. Gignoux (the chairman of the Judicial Conference's Standing Committee on Rules of
Practice and Procedure) informed one and all that his standing committee's Advisory Com
mittee on Civil Rules . . . was "initiating a comprehensive review of the structure of the
rules," with special attention to rule 56, the prosecution of class actions under rule 2 3, and
the use of sanctions under rule I I.
In an interview, Gignoux characterized the review of those rules as "the first step"
toward a broader re-evaluation of the Federal Rules. He explained "the general thought" is
that instead of simply "reacting" individually to problems with the rules, federal judges
should "look back at what's happened after 50 years and see whether the rules need basic
restructuring and improvement."
Graham, ADR Conference A irs Hopes - A nd Some Doubts, Legal Times, Oct. 14, 1985, at 2, col.
I.

7 9. See Subrin, supra note 7, a t 96 8-6 9, 972-73, 998- 1000. This process h a s already begun.
See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 47 5 U.S. 57 4 (1986 ); Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 106 S . Ct. 2 548 (1986 ); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 2 505 (1986).
80. See Sherman, supra note 11, at 7 45-46 .
81. See pp. 6 06-27; Burbank, supra note 2 0.
82 . See Burbank, supra note 57, at 426-27; Graham, supra note 9, at 942 -43.
83. See Strandell v. Jackson County, Ill., 115 F.R.D. 333 (S.D. Ill. 1987 ) (criminal contempt
sanction imposed on attorney for refusing to participate in summary jury trial); 55 U . S. L.W.
2 12 0 (Aug. 26, 1986) ("Based on his observations, (Judge) Feikens reported that the j udges who
impose the most sanctions have the longest dockets in that district court. "). See also Sarokin,
Justice Rushed is Justice Denied, 38 RUTGERS L. REv. 431 (1986).
In an interesting essay, Professor Fiss discusses the dangers of some of the methods that
federal j udges have devised for dealing with complex litigation, to wit, the use of judicial surro
gates such as magistrates and special masters. See Fiss, The Burea ucratiza tion of the Judiciary,
92 YALE L.J. 1442 (1983). See also R. POSNER, supra note 2 4, at 102 -19 (law clerks and staff
attorneys). Fiss correctly argues that a "Weberian emphasis on rigidity" or a charge of "exces
sive rule-bound behavior," Fiss, supra, at 1451 (emphasis in original), cannot properly be im
puted to the federal judiciary. But he fails to see that in this respect more bureaucracy may
prove a cure rather than a disease. See Elliott, supra note 2 9, at 317; note 90 infra. For reference
to a magistrate, see pp. 627 -43.
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law and equity, gave us equity rather than law, 84 and that the 1 96 6
amendments made the triumph complete.85 Of what use was i t t o talk
about the evils of common law or code procedure without also identi
fying the evils of equity procedure and how your system would avoid
them?86 Today, we should not be talking about the decline of adjudi
catory procedure, except perhaps as one would at a wake. 87 Long ago,
Professor Sunderland rejected on grounds of "economic extrava
gance" the theory of procedure according to which the "parties them
selves framed their own controversies, and laid them before the court
for decision" and the "judges never sought to protect themselves or
the parties from the useless trial of issues based upon allegations or
denials which had no colorable existence in fact. "88 That does not
mean that the critics are wrong. It means, rather, that history has
passed them by. If present trends are to be reversed, we may indeed
need to "turn back the clock,"89 to see whether it is possible to merge
law and equity, adversariness and judicial control, without submerging
one or the other. The enterprise will reveal substantial - perhaps
unacceptable - costs, but the relevant comparison is not just the costs
of the equity-based procedure initiated in 1 9 3 8.90 As Complex Litiga
tion shows, federal judges are moving further beyond equity, in some
cases returning to practices previously rejected, even at the trial stage.
So long as efficient administration and judicial control (power) are
considered the summa bona of procedure, a requirement that "the di
rect testimony of witnesses under the control of a party be presented in
the form of narrative written statements"9 1 makes eminent sense. It
84. See Subrin, supra note 7; note 6 3 supra and accompanying text.
85. The 1966 amendments included revisions of the rules governing compulsory joinder (rule
19), intervention (rule 2 4), and class actions (rule 2 3). See generally Kaplan, Continuing Work of
the Civil Committee: 1966 A mendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (pts. I & 2), 81
HARV. L. R E V. 356, 59 1 ( 1967-68).
86. See text accompanying notes 38-40 supra. In fact, as Professor Subrin has noted, propo
nents of Supreme Court rulemaking and of the Federal Rules "repeatedly cited the case of
Jarndyce v. Jarndyce in Dickens' Bleakhouse as representative of the type of technicality they
were trying to avoid," forgetting "that a major point of the novel was the perpetual fog surround
ing Chancery." Subrin, supra note 7, at 9 82 (footnote omitted).
87. See notes 30 & 74 supra.
88. Sunderland, Theory and Practice, supra note 74, at 2 15. See also Sunderland, Discovery
Before Trial, supra note 74, at 737.
89. See text accompanying note 40 supra.
90. "The attempt to escape the necessity of making explicit cost-benefit judgments about
procedure merely leads to evasive techniques like managerial judging that invite judges to narrow
issues in an ad hoc fashion without safeguards." Elliott, supra note 29, at 32 1 (emphasis in
original). Elsewhere, however, Professor Elliott suggests that recent amendments to rule 26 may
be sufficient for this purpose in the context of discovery. See id. at 322 . Although the amended
rule provides standards for decisionmaking, there remains cause for concern about the breadth of
discretion afforded, see text accompanying notes 38- 40 supra, as well as about the efficiency of a
procedural system that must rely on ad hoc decisions.
9 1 . W. SCHWARZER, MANAGING ANTITRUST AND OTHER COMPLEX LITIGATION:
HANDBOOK FOR LAWYERS AND JUDGES

supra note 11, at 746.

A
§ 7-3(A) ( 1 9 82), reprinted at p. 613. See Sherman,
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recalls the days when suits in equity were determined largely on the
paper record created by the parties. 92 But the Supreme Court changed
that system in its Equity Rules of 1 9 1 2, and it perpetuated the require
ment that the "testimony of witnesses . . . be taken orally in open
court" in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.93 Ironically, efficient
administration was also a goal in 1 9 1 2,94 but neither then nor in 1 9 3 7
(when the Court promulgated the Federal Rules) was i t the only value
served by requiring live testimony.95
Some law reformers, including some federal judges, do not like ju
ries.96 Jury trials, particularly in complex cases, appear inefficient,
and they undoubtedly derogate from the power of trial judges. It is no
surprise that, here again, calls for reform include allegations of incom
petence.97 Happily, here as elsewhere, Professor Galanter's work may
help to shed some empirical light on the reform debate.98 Moreover,
careful scholarship has thwarted attempts to find historical support for
an exception to the constitutional right to jury trial in complex cases.99
But some have not been deterred. Thus, the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit has ruled that permitting a case to be tried to a jury may
in some circumstances violate due process. 100
When a case's complexity results wholly or in part from the join
der of parties and claims permitted or required by procedural rules,
there is something odd about reasoning that uses the costs of complex
ity as the excuse for denying trial by jury. We are confronted by the
spectacle of the government denying an explicit constitutional right in
92. Professor Sherman asks whether an "offer of proof" procedure portends a "move away
from the traditional Anglo-American notion that oral testimony elicited through direct and cross
examination of a witness observed by the factfinder is the preferred form of evidence." Sherman,
supra note I I, at 746. That was not the tradition in equity. See Lane, Federal Equity Rules, 3 5
HARV. L . REV. 276, 278, 2 9 1 -92 ( 1 922).
93. FED. R. Civ. P. 43(a) Equity Rule 46 provided in pertinent part that "[i]n all trials in
equity the testimony of witnesses shall be taken orally in open court, except as otherwise pro
vided by statute or these rules. " 226 U.S. 66 1 ( 1 9 1 2).
.

94. See Los Angeles Brush Mfg. Corp. v. James, 272 U.S. 70 1 , 706-07 ( 1 927).
95. See Report of the Special Committee to Suggest Remedies and Formulate Proposed L aws
to Prevent Delay and Unnecessary Cos t in L itigation, 3 6 A.B.A. REP. 448, 456-59 ( 1 9 1 1 ) ; 3 J.
MOORE & J. FRIEDMAN, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 43.02 ( 1 9 38); Subrin, supra note 7, at
979, 986.
96. This is a long tradition. See Subrin, supra note 7, at 968-69. For a relatively recent
manifestation, see Remarks of Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, Meeting of the Conference of
Chief Judges, Flagstaff, Ariz. (Aug. 7, 1 979) (copy on file with the Michigan Law Review) .
97. See Burger, supra note 96. See also M . Galanter, Jury Shadows: Reflections on the Civil
Jury and the "Litigation Explosion" 1 -3 (rev. ed. Nov. 1 986) (unpublished manuscript) (copy on
file with the Michigan L aw Review).
9 8 . See M. Galanter, supra note 97.
99. See Arnold, A Historical Inquiry into the Right to Trial by Jury in Complex Civil Litiga
tion, 1 28 U. PA. L. RE v. 829 ( 1 980); Arnold, A Modest Replication to a Lengthy Discourse, 1 2 8
u . PA. L. REV. 9 8 6 ( 1 980).
1 00. In re Japanese Elec. Prod. Antitrust Litig., 63 1 F.2d 1 069 (3d Cir. 1 980), excerp ted at
pp. 679-80.
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order to remedy a supposed constitutional problem for which the gov
ernment itself is at least partially responsible. 101 This is the case when
complexity results from enforced joinder, including by operation of
preclusion rules, 102 or from joinder initiated by a party who seeks to
avoid a jury trial. Even when the party seeking a jury trial is responsi
ble, one might suppose that before denying the constitutional right the
court would explore the option of breaking the lawsuit into smaller,
less complex packages, and thus unraveling complexity the govern
ment has helped to create. 103
In this light, one may be less sanguine about what I have called
definitional agnosticism or the shotgun approach to complex litigation.
In the introduction to their chapter on the disposition of duplicative or
related litigation, the authors of Complex Litigation tell us:
Litigation may be called complex because of the joinder of multiple
parties, the difficulty of the issues involved, or the volume of discovery
and evidence necessitating substantial court administration. Sometimes,
however, cases take on complexities by virtue of their relationship to
other cases. Although filed separately, cases can be so clearly related
that they should be looked at as part of the same piece of litigation . If
such cases are tried separately without considering their relationship to
other pending litigation, the objective of just and efficient resolution of
disputes may be frustrated. Allowing separate cases between the same
parties on the same or similar issues to proceed independently is not only
wasteful, but encourages parties to forum shop and to try to obtain an
advantage by multiple litigation of the same matters. Even when sepa
rate cases have only some of the same parties or issues, separate litigation
can be wasteful and can result in inconsistent or conflicting determina
tions, leading to uncertainty as to what has been decided and as to the
impact of judgments in other suits.

[p.

1 48]

It is common ground that courts require the tools necessary to pre
vent or discourage parties from conducting duplicative litigation,
whether the tool of choice be an injunction or a preclusion rule. There
has been some pressure on preclusion law to open up the category of
persons who may be bound by prior litigation. 1 04 Proposals to that
end are useful for present purposes because they illustrate that a cost
of taking an expansive view of complex litigation for reform purposes
may be to undermine values traditionally associated with due pro1 0 1 . Cf p. 683 ("Don't many of the complexities of litigation now result from joinder and
other procedural mechanisms that did not exist [in 1 7 9 1 ]?").
1 02. "[A]s the rules of procedure have expanded the scope of the initial opportunity to liti
gate, they have invited a corresponding expansion of the extent to which that opportunity fore
closes a subsequent opportunity. . . . [T]his is the clear tendency of the modern law of res
judicata." F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, JR., CiVIL PROCEDURE § 1 1 .2, at 589 (3d ed. 1 98 5) .
103. Cf p. 6 8 3 ("Can other procedural mechanisms such a s bifurcation be used t o ameliorate
the difficulties posed by these procedural innovations?").
1 04. See, e.g. , pp. 739-59, 783-92; George, Sweet Uses of A dversity: Parklane Hosiery and the
Collateral Class Action, 32 STAN. L. REv. 655 ( 1 980); McCoid, A Single Package for Multiparty
Disputes, 28 STAN. L. REV. 707, 709 - 1 0, 7 1 4- 1 8 ( 1 976).
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cess . 1 05 But preclusion law is not where reform proposals are likely to
center. Their focus is likely to be on mechanisms for packaging re
lated litigation.
In an interesting recent article, Professor Rowe and Mr. Sibley
have proposed a federal statute that would exploit the jurisdictional
potential of federal courts to deal with related litigation. 1 06 Others
have been concerned about the implications of a recent Supreme Court
decision for class actions, state and federal. 107 These are worthwhile
areas of inquiry. Those considering reform proposals should remem
ber, however, that in dealing with dispersed litigation regarded as
complex because it is related, they run the risk of creating litigation
packages that are complex because of their structure. 1 08 If, as I have
argued, we have not yet adequately addressed the costs of current ar
rangements for litigation in the federal (or state) courts, 1 09 it would be
hard to justify reforms that exacerbate those costs. Yes, we can rede
fine fairness, 1 10 but let us be precise about both the values we seek to
further in our procedural systems and those that are protected by the
Constitution. 1 1 1 Efficient administration is one such value, although

l
I

1 05. See, e.g., Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 327 n. 7 ( 1 979). See also text
accompanying notes 1 1 0- 1 3 infra; Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 1 05 S. Ct. 2965, 2980 ( 1 985)
("[A state] may not take a transaction with little or no relationship to the forum and apply the
law of the forum in order to satisfy the procedural requirement that there be a 'common question
of law.' ").
1 06. See Rowe & Sibley, Beyon d Diversity: Federal Multiparty, Multiforum Jurisdic tion, 1 3 5
U . PA. L . REv. 7 ( 1 986). The problem the authors address i s "the unavailability o f any single
forum in which to consolidate scattered, related litigation - a difficulty that is becoming more
and more common given the increasing number of complex tort actions. . " !d. at 9 (footnote
omitted). They note that "[t]he American Law Institute (ALI) has undertaken a preliminary
study of possible reforms in the statutes and rules governing complex litigation; the project's
purview includes consideration of changes in federal subject matter jurisdiction, removal, venue,
consolidation, process, and choice of law." !d. at 10 (footnotes omitted). See Proposal for Pre
limin ary Study of Revision of Statutes and Procedural Rules Governing Complex Civil Litigation,
7 A.L.l. REP., July 1 985, at 1 1 - 1 2.
.

.

107. See Miller & Crump, supra note 50 (discussing Shutts) . The authors include sections
entitled "Procedural Tools for Judicial Management of Multistate Class Actions," id. at 67-74,
and "Legislative Solutions to the Questions Raised by Shutts, " id. at 74-80. In the latter section,
the authors note that the ALI Study Project on Complex Litigation, see note 1 06 supra, includes
consideration of federal jurisdiction in multiparty, multistate disputes. See id. at 75, 76 & n. 522,
79 & n.538.
1 08. Rowe and Sibley are aware of this risk. See Rowe & Sibley, supra note 1 06, at 1 7. See
also Miller & Crump, supra note 50, at 79-80. But see note 1 09 infra.
1 09. Rowe and Sibley count as possible costs of their proposals the creation of litigation that
is unwieldy and the sacrifice of "important interests in individual control of actions and fair
treatment of individual claims." Rowe & Sibley, supra note 1 06, at 1 7 . See also Trangsrud,
supra note 4 1 . This is by no means a complete catalogue of the costs of complexity. See, e.g ,
note 4 1 supra; text accompanying notes 53-7 1 & 1 0 1 - 1 03 supra; text accompanying notes 1 1 4-37
infra. For that reason, I am not sanguine that "tools of court management [will] minimize the
dangers of consolidation." Rowe & Sibley, supra note 1 06, at 1 7.
1 1 0. See Newman, Rethinking Fairn ess: Perspectives on the Litigation Process, 94 YALE L.J.
1 643 ( 1 985).
I l l . The chief advantage of the cost-minimization approach is that it helps to assure con
sideration of the various different goals of the system and their interrelationship. However,

''
l
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in other contexts we have been told that we must live with constitu
tional arrangements that are inefficient. 1 12 Individual dignity, effectu
ation, and participation compete with efficient administration at every
turn. 1 1 3 They also compete with judicial power.
IV.

THE FLIGHT

FROM LAW

The ultimate cost of complexity is surrender of the ideal of justice
under law. At a time when so few civil cases are resolved by trial l 1 4
and when there i s growing interest i n diverting cases from the courts,
it is a pity that Complex Litigation treats alternative dispute resolution
as an add-on (pp. 8 1 4-40). The material on encouraging settlement
(pp. 683-9 1 ) does not redress the balance, both because it is so abbrevi
ated and because its location in the book hinders a coherent view of
the flight from law. 1 1 5
In a recent article, Professor Galanter identified "two recurrent
themes that impel and justify involvement in the settlement prothe approach is of little help if the definition of costs is itself incomplete or vague. The
specific interrelationships of goals are wholly obscured if all non-administrative goals are
lumped together as one.
Bush, supra note 1 7, at 930.
1 1 2. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 9 19, 959 ( 1 983).
[I]t is not clear that the utilitarian balancing analysis asks the constitutionally relevant ques
tions. The due process clause is one of those Bill of Rights protections meant to insure
individual liberty in the face of contrary collective action. Therefore, a collective legislative
or administrative decision about procedure, one arguably reflecting the intensity of the con
tending social values and representing an optimum position from the contemporary social
perspective, cannot answer the constitutional question of whether due process has been
accorded.
Mashaw, supra note 1 9, at 48-49, excerpted in R. COVER & 0. FISS, supra note 1 5, at 2 1 .
1 1 3 . See note 3 7 supra and accompanying text.
1 1 4. The rate of settlements remains high. The great majority of civil cases are settled.
The portion of cases that run the whole course of possible contest has continued a long
historical decline. In the federal courts, cases reaching trial have fallen from 1 5. 2 % of ter
minations in 1 940 to 5.0% of terminations in 1 985. In state courts, too, a smaller portion of
cases is decided by full contest than in the past.
Galanter, L itigation Explosion, supra note 24, at 8 (footnotes omitted).
For caution about equating terminations or dispositions with settlement, see Kritzer, Adjudi
cation to Settlemen t: Shading in the Gray, 70 JUDICATURE 1 6 1 ( 1 986).
1 1 5. Reforming procedural incentives to promote just settlements requires a fundamental
change in the way that we view civil procedure. Before such changes can be made, we will
have to stop thinking of the "pretrial" process as a prelude to trial, and start thinking of it as
the "main event" - as the matrix of incentives within which the overwhelming majority of
cases are going to be settled by two party-appointed arbitrators (the opposing lawyers). The
most pervasive "ADR" system in the United States today is probably pretrial procedure
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure . . . .
Elliott, supra note 29, at 33 5-36.
Before taking Professor Elliott's advice, however, one should decide whether, as a normative
matter, procedure should be crafted so as to encourage settlement - in all cases or in some
subset of cases. See text accompanying notes 1 1 6-27 infra. Moreover, that question should be
addressed in the context of considering a variety of dispute resolution processes. See Bush, supra
note 1 7, at 905-07; Rhode, supra note 24, at 286-88; text accompanying notes 1 25-30 infra. Fi
nally, amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure designed to "encourage" settlement
may raise questions of political legitimacy. See text accompanying notes 64-7 1 supra; Burbank,
supra note 57.
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cess," 1 1 6 which he called the "warm" theme and the "cool" theme.
He defined them as follows:
The "warm" theme refers to the impulse to replace adversary conflict by
a process of conciliation to bring the parties into a mutual accord that
expresses and produces community among them. The "cool" theme em
phasizes not a more admirable process but efficient institutional manage
ment:

clearing

dockets,

reducing

delay,

eliminating

expense,

un

burdening the courts. 1 1 7

The authors of Complex Litigation include in their materials on
settlement an excerpt from a speech by Judge Tone that plays both
themes. 1 1 8 To Tone, settlement is in most cases more likely to lead to
optimal justice than adjudication, and aggressive participation by the
judge is necessary "in order to manage a burgeoning caseload" (p.
684). Unfortunately, the authors do not force students to confront an
opposing view. 1 1 9 Certainly, the federal statistics on cases that actu
ally come to trial suggest that if a substantial portion of filed cases
were not settled the system would collapse. 1 20 In that respect the set
tlement of civil cases is like plea bargaining in criminal cases. Profes
sor Fiss has argued that the analogy carries further:
Settlement is for me the civil analogue of plea bargaining:

Consent is

often coerced; the bargain may be struck by someone without authority;
the absence of a trial and judgment renders subsequent judicial involve
ment troublesome; and although dockets are trimmed, j ustice may not be
done. Like plea bargaining, settlement is a capitulation to the conditions
of mass society and should be neither encouraged nor praised. 1 2 1

It may be that advocates of settlement like Judge Tone and oppo
nents like Professor Fiss are talking past each other. Tone speaks of
cases in which the amount of money is small in relation to the antici
pated cost of litigation or in which nonmonetary relief is the plaintiff 's
central objective and it is less painful for the defendant to give that
relief than to bear the expense of additional litigation (p. 685). Piss is
concerned mainly with structural public law litigation. 1 2 2 But even if
they are talking past each other, that very perception should cause one
to question whether a trans-substantive solution makes sense. 123
116 . Galanter, The Emergence of the Judge as a Mediator in Civil Cases, 6 9 JUDICATURE
257. 257 ( 1986).
117 . Id. For a recent example of the "warm" theme, see McThenia & Shaffer, For Reconcili
ation, 94 YALE L.J. 1660 ( 198 5). But see Fiss, Out of Eden, 94 YALE L.J. 166 9 ( 198 5) .
118 . Tone, The Role of the Judge in the Settlement Process, in SEMINARS FOR NEWLY AP
POINTED UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGES 57, 58-60, 6 1-66 (197 5), excerpted at pp. 68 3-8 7 .
1 19. The authors do, however, alert teachers t o such a view. See TEACHERS MANUAL, supra
note 3, at 208 -09. This material should be in the book.
120. See note 114 supra.
121. Fiss, A gainst Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 107 5 (198 4) . But see Alschuler, supra note
24, at 18 20- 31 (arguing that settlement can be problematic, but for different reasons).
122. See Fiss, supra note 121, passim.
123. See Burbank, supra note 57. The 198 4 proposed amendment to rule 68 exempted only
class and derivative actions. Jd. at 429 n . 20.
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Moreover, Tone's second category surely includes some of the cases
that are Fiss' special concern, and the problems that Fiss and others
identify are by no means confined to such cases. 1 24
In any event, the debate about settlement should be placed in the
context of a more general debate about modes of dispute resolution. A
central question in that debate should be whether courts exist primar
ily or exclusively to resolve disputes or whether, in addition, they exist
to perform functions one or more of which would, in certain cases, be
put at risk by settlement, arbitration, mediation, mini-trials, rent-a
judge, or some other alternative to litigation. 1 25 To what extent are
proposals to reform the adjudicatory process (or to divert cases from
the courts) likely to rob that process of its distinctive attributes? Pro
fessor Fiss puts it this way :
Many o f the factors that lead a society t o bring social relationships that
otherwise seem wholly private (e.g . , marriage) within the jurisdiction of
a court, such as imbalances of power or the interests of third parties, are
also likely to make settlement problematic.

Settlement is a poor substi

tute for judgement; it is an even poorer substitute for the withdrawal of
j urisdiction .
. . . Civil litigation is an institutional arrangement for using state

power to bring a recalcitrant reality closer to our chosen ideals . 1 2 6

There is a good deal of force in this argument, but it misses an
important point. To the extent that equity has gobbled up law, the
pressure on parties to settle cases may correspondingly increase. 127
Moreover, in such a world, the attractiveness of Professor Fiss' ideal
may depend on the confidence one reposes in judges. And with all the
talk about judicial power in this essay, one might well ask why key
1 24. In fact, it is argued, because of their frequency, consumer disputes (and perhaps other
types of small claims) involve large potentials for activity costs in the aggregate; therefore
despite the small amounts at stake in individual cases, an adjudicatory process is called for
- rule-oriented, and resource-allocation-based - to minimize these very significant costs.
Bush, supra note 1 7, at 967-68. See also Fiss, supra note 1 2 1 , at 1 087-89.
1 25 . See note 63 supra. See also Sarokin, supra note 83, at 433, 437-38.
1 26. Fiss, supra note 1 2 1 , at 1 08 8-89. See also Galanter, Litigation Explosion, supra note 24,
at 3 8-39; Alschuler, supra note 24, at 1 8 1 6- 1 7; Delgado, Dunn, Brown, Lee & Hubbert, Fairn ess
and Formality: Min imizing the R isk of Prejudice in A lternative Dispute R esolution, 1 98 5 Wts. L.
REV. 1 3 59.
1 27. For the role of uncertainty in the settlement of the Agent Orange litigation, see Schuck,
supra note 50, at 346, 3 5 2-53. As indicated there, the proposition in the text is contrary to that
suggested by certain economic models. See also Alschuler, supra note 24, at 1 82 5-28 & n.85.
Professor Bush has noted that "adjudication is only theoretically rule-oriented or preceden
tial; in operation, it is often impossible to predict decisions or awards based on previous cases."
Bush, supra note 1 7, at 943. Moreover, in connection with the view that the availability of
adjudication affects settlement, see Mnookin & Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the
Law: Th e Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 ( 1 979), Professor Bush observed: "For this to
occur, however, the 'shadow of the law,' i.e., the possibility of moving into rule-based adjudica
tion, must be real and not fictional." Bush, supra note 1 7 , at 979 n. 1 73. See also Subrin, supra
note 7, at 989 ("bargaining . . . in the shadow of a shadow"); A1schu1er, supra note 24, at 1 823
n. 64.
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members of the federal judiciary have jumped on the ADR band
wagon. 1 28 In doing so, are they not repudiating power?
As Professor Subrin has suggested, the alternatives in current fash
ion represent a logical terminus in the progression from law in the
sense that Justice Harlan described it, through equity, to dispute reso
lution simpliciter. 1 29 It is also true - and perhaps an explanation suf
ficient in itself - that judges are not lacking for business; indeed, they
are tormented by statisticians interested only in case dispositions. 1 30
Federal judges may recognize, in other words, that power is a feeble
instrument if there is no time to exercise it. When we recognize, how
ever, that pre-trial and not trial is the scene of the action in federal
courts, a somewhat different explanation is suggested, one that may
shed additional light on recently proposed amendments to rule 68. 1 3 1
Professor Galanter has suggested that the federal judiciary's view
of the role of pre-trial procedure in effecting settlement has changed
over time. 1 32 Professor Resnik has suggested that the current view is
problematic at least in terms of a historical/ideal model of adjudica
tion. 1 33 For present purposes, the important point is that with few
civil cases being tried in federal court, ADR is fertile ground for the
exercise of power: power to "influence" settlement, 1 34 to establish the
rules and procedures for court-annexed arbitration and other alterna
tives to adjudication, 1 35 and indeed, conceivably, to structure a dispute
resolution system of the sort described by Professor Sander. 1 36 At the
least, this perspective gives added bite to a distinction between ADR
128. See, e.g. , Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, 1984 Year-End Report on the Judiciary 1 5-1 6
(copy on file with the Michigan Law Review ). Cf Rhode, supra note 24, at 2 8 3-84 ("What is,
however, distinctive about the current climate is the intensity of support for alternative dispute
resolution within powerful public, private, and professional constituencies.").
129 . See Subrin, supra note 7, at 98 7-9 1. But see Bush, supra note 17, at 9 73-8 7 (arguing that
the comparative advantage of adjudication over other modes of dispute resolution in terms of
formal values is not as great as is usually assumed).
130. See, e. g., Enslen, Should Judges Manage Their Own Caseloads?, 70 J UDICATURE 2 00,
2 01 (198 7).
131. See generally Burbank, supra note 57.
132. See Galanter, supra note 116. See also Galanter, ". . . A Settlement Judge, not a Trial
Judge: " Judicial Mediation in the United States, 12 J . L . & Socv. I (198 5).
133. See Resnik, Managerial Judges, 9 6 HARV. L. REV. 374, 388 -9 0, 4 01-02, 406, 42 5-31
(1982 ). See also Alschuler, supra note 24, at 18 35-36; text accompanying note 8 7 supra. But see
Flanders, Blind Umpires - A Response to Professor Resnik, 35 HASTINGS L . J . 505, 510- 14
(1984).
134 . See text accompanying note 50 supra; Sarokin, supra note 8 3, at 4 34-36. Cf Galanter,
supra note 116, at 2 62 (active judicial participation in settlement may "be a response to a shift in
the character of common law adjudication").
135. See generally Levin & Golash, Alternative Dispute Resolution in Federal District Courts,
37 U. FLA. L. REv. 29 (198 5). But see Roberts, The Myth of Uniformity in Federal Civil Proce
dure: Federal Civil Rule 83 and District Court Local Rulemaking Powers, 8 U. PUGET SOUND L.
REV . 537, 544 -45 (198 5).
136. See Sander, Varieties of Dispute Processing, in THE POU N D CONFERENCE: PERSPEC
65 (A. L . Levin & R. Wheeler eds. 19 79).
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modes that are court-annexed and those that take place outside the
courts. Perhaps now we can explain procedural reformers' seemingly
schizophrenic reaction to arbitration. 1 3 7
*

*

*

Professors Marcus and Sherman have rendered a service to the
profession. Complex Litigation is not only an excellent course book; it
is a highly useful reference work. The book has appeared at a time
when it is most needed. The federal rulemakers are considering a
comprehensive reexamination of the Federal Rules. 1 38 The American
Law Institute is pursuing three inquiries that will necessarily include
consideration of problems of complex litigation. 1 39 Legislative reform
proposals have been introduced, 1 40 and more are sure to follow.
In the past, the nature of procedural study and scholarship was
such that few lawyers or scholars would have been equipped to con
tribute to the reform debate that is now brewing. 1 4 1 From that per
spective, Complex Litigation represents a major contribution to
knowledge. The challenge for the law reformer is not to get carried
away: not to let one set of practical problems characteristic of com
plex litigation preclude attention to others, 1 42 not to let images of com
plex litigation preclude attention to litigation that is not complex, 1 43
not to let practical problems preclude attention to process values other
than efficient administration, 1 44 and not to consider process values in
the vacuum of trial or pre-trial procedure. 1 45

! 37. See Burbank, supra note 57, at 427. See also Bush, supra note 1 7, at 1 00 1 -02 (discussing
process biases that may arise from self-interest and professional socialization); Merry, Disputing
Without Culture (Book Review), 1 00 HARV. L. REV. 2057, 2069- 7 1 ( 1 987) (criticizing the ADR
movement for presuming an "indifferent state"). Cf Rhode, supra note 24, at 276 ("Much re
formist rhetoric has a curiously schizophrenic tone."); Trubek, Turning Away from Law? (Book
Review), 82 MICH. L. REv. 824, 827 ( 1 984) (exploring "current paradoxes in elite rhetoric").
1 38. See note 78 supra.
1 39. For the Institute's Study Project on Complex Litigation, see notes 1 06-07 supra. The
Institute is also conducting a "Project on Compensation and Liability for Product and Process
Injuries," which includes consideration of "various alternative procedures for resolving claims
and controversies, including jury and court trials, administrative rulemaking and adjudication,
optional or mandatory arbitration, and other systems of dispute resolution. " AM. LAW. INST.,
1 986 ANNUAL REPORT 1 5, 1 7. Finally, the Institute has embarked on a study of the litigation
process. See New Restatement Projects and Study of Litigation Process Planned, 8 A . L . I . REP.,
July 1 9 8 6, at l .
1 40. See, e.g., H.R. 43 1 5, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. § 3 ( 1 986); H.R. 3690, 98th Cong., 1 st Sess.
§ 4 ( 1 983); Rowe & Sibley, supra note 106, at 9- 1 0.
1 4 1 . See text accompanying notes 8-9 supra.
1 42. See text accompanying notes 1 3 & 1 03-09 supra.
1 43. See text accompanying notes 1 1 - 1 2, and text following note 30 supra.
144. See text accompanying notes 1 5-41 & 1 10- ! 3 supra.
145 . See note 1 5 supra; text accompanying notes 1 1 4-37 supra.

